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After nearly two decades of public discussion and government reports,
Australia established a national specialist charity regulator in 2012, the
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (“ACNC”), but a
change of government had Parliament considering a bill to repeal the regulator less than two years later. 1 The narrative for legal and regulatory reform steadily developed a theme of reducing the administrative burden on
charities, but this discourse was not accepted by the parliamentary opposition parties at the time or by some discrete parts of the charity sector. They
argued that the establishment of the specialist regulator was an increased
impost on charities, many of which would be publicly filing an annual return with financials for the first time, something which was not part of previous taxation exemption regulation. Further, the opposition parties
claimed it was evidence of an unhealthy extension of state power into civil
society. They acknowledged chaotic and duplicative regulation at the state
level, but argued this was a matter for those jurisdictions to handle, and the
Commonwealth should not trespass on their responsibilities. The benefits
usually advanced for having a national regulator, such as increased accountability and transparency, promoting enhanced public support, oversight of taxation concessions and anti-terrorist funding measures, were a
second order to red tape reduction in the political narrative.
Without the support of minor parties in the Senate, the present government has been unable to progress the disestablishment of the ACNC.
Two government inquiries commissioned by the current government and a
Senate committee report concerning the fate of the ACNC have clearly
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indicated the depth of support for its continuation in the charity sector. 2 In
the meantime, the ACNC has had the unenviable task of fulfilling its statutory functions without the support of the government and having some
minority, but powerful, voices within the sector advocating for its abolition.
This has destabilized its attempts to create a public register of charities and
its work towards other statutory objects. It has been a regulator under siege!
This article examines how, in an environment that all sides agreed was
overburdened with unnecessary and duplicative red tape, the charities regulator instituted with a clear statutory objective to reduce regulatory obligations could instead be seen as part of the problem. It seeks to understand
this paradoxical position by first tracing the discourse about regulatory
obligations through nearly twenty years of public debate and government
reports on the issue of charity reform. Second, it examines evidence-based
research as to the actual nature of the regulatory burden faced by nonprofit
organizations both before and after the ACNC establishment. Thirdly, it
examines how the current government has proposed to approach the issues
at hand. Finally, some observations are made to explain the apparent paradox.
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A report on charitable organizations by the Industry Commission, released in 1995, was the first of a series of reports over the next twenty
years that made recommendations about regulatory issues of the sector.3
The Industry Commission was an independent government research body
with a strong economic focus, given briefs by the Commonwealth government often with input from state and territory governments, to assess industry policy reform. The brief on charitable organizations was one of the first
outside the manufacturing, infrastructure and utility industries for the
Commission (although now, as the Productivity Commission, it reports
regularly on social welfare issues).
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The terms of reference do not allude to regulatory costs and were focused on the efficiency of charitable service delivery. Submissions received
from the sector described numerous instances of overlapping regulation
between jurisdictions in relation to association incorporation, fundraising,
tax concessions and the cost of duplicative information requirements of
government funders. It also noted that Australia’s tax agency, the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”), did not receive any annual report or financial
statements from tax concession charities, and most charities self-assessed
their own concessional taxation status. It is difficult in relation to charity
tax concessions to conceive of a lower red tape regime. The final report
accepted the sector’s assertions that government administration should be
streamlined in regulating state-based tax concessions, nonprofit corporate
structures and fundraising, as well as reporting to both state and federal
government funders. While not identifying specific reforms, it recommended:
x Harmonizing inconsistent taxation definition concessions between federal and state jurisdictions; 4
x Harmonizing fundraising regulation; 5
x Creating accounting standards for the nonprofit sector; 6
x Creating a specific form of Commonwealth incorporation for
charities that would centralize public financial reporting; 7 and
x Increasing the ATO’s role as a central regulator. 8
The Commission’s recommendations were not implemented, as its
publication coincided with a change of government, and the recommendations were not part of the new conservative government’s policy agenda.
It was not until a new Commonwealth government decided to introduce a broad-based goods and services tax (“GST”) in 1999 that red tape
was placed back on to the political agenda. Charities faced the transition
from being completely exempt from Wholesale Sales Tax to a limited concession regime based upon the character of the specific transaction.9 This
tax reform also established a national register of organizations subject to
the GST. Previously, concessional nonprofit organizations had been allowed to self-assess their status without any formal registration or annual
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returns. In order to pass the reform legislation introducing the GST, minor
party senators, who held the balance of power, required the government to
hold an inquiry about the suitability of concessional charity definitions. The
inquiry, known as the Charity Definition Inquiry (“CDI”), mainly recommended a codification of the common law definition of charity and devoted
a chapter to administering the definition. 10 Many submissions to the inquiry
had given examples of overlaps in the administration of the definitions
between the Commonwealth and the states and suggested an independent
administrative body or a specialist body within the ATO as a single point of
decision-making. 11 There were contrary views, and the report noted that:
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This was supported by the Catholic Church, which argued against an
independent charity commission but suggested a specialist advisory body to
make recommendations about charitable status. 13 The CDI report made
recommendations for a national uniform charity definition with a regulator
independent of the ATO with a sector education function. 14
After receiving the recommendations of the CDI Inquiry Report, the
federal government announced in 2003 that it intended to legislate a statutory definition of charity for all federal purposes, including income tax
exemption, and requested that the Board of Taxation prepare a report on a
draft bill, which was released for consultation in May 2004. 15 The Board of
Taxation is a body independent of government, which reviews potential
taxation legislation and advises the government on improving its design
and effectiveness. The Board was to consult, not about the announced poli-
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cy of the government, but about its workability as enacted in the draft legislation. The Board drew attention to possible defects in the draft and reported widespread opposition to the bill as presented amongst charities and
their professional advisors. 16 The bill differed from the CDI recommendations in some key areas, which made many in the sector uncomfortable. 17
The Board devoted a short chapter of its report to the administrative burden
of the proposed bill. 18 While finding it difficult to identify any extra administrative burden as a result of the bill’s alteration of the definitional boundary of charity, it was a notable topic in the discussions the Board had with
sector participants. It recommended that the extent of the administrative
burden be established through research, and a post-implementation review
be considered. 19 The Treasurer finally brought a much shorter, revised bill
before Parliament to amend the definition of charity in a very limited way,
ignoring most of the CDI recommendations.20 Active charity reform went
into abeyance until the election of a new federal government in 2007, but
the nonprofit red tape narrative continued to develop during this period.
Three influences can be identified that assisted ‘red tape’ in gradually
becoming a dominant nonprofit reform narrative in the sector. First, isomorphic pressures have played a part, as the business sector had successfully campaigned on red tape reduction to both sides of politics since 2000.
The tangible benefits to the business sector—from significant industry
reforms, to nationalizing or harmonizing previously inconsistent state regulations—were significant. Corporate law, financial institution and securities
law, national building construction codes, uniform competition and consumer law, and standard business reporting (“SBR”) were all red tape cost
savers for businesses. 21 For example, SBR streamlined business-togovernment reporting by removing duplicate information from government
forms, using business software to fill forms automatically with relevant
information, 22 providing an electronic interface to report to state and feder-
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al agencies directly from accounting software, and providing a secure single sign-on for online users. 23 The Productivity Commission estimates
$500 million in potential benefits from this reform over nine years.24 Few
of these reforms benefited nonprofit organizations directly as they were not
included in the terms of reference, but they recognized the significant benefits won by business interests.
Second, there was recognition that red tape reviews established in the
United Kingdom and Europe included the nonprofit sector in their remit,
unlike Australia.25 The UK’s 2005 Better Regulation Task Force report
asserted that “[t]oo many third sector organisations are still stuck with unwieldy structures and onerous reporting requirements.” 26 On the announcement of the resulting bill in 2006, HM Treasury and UK Cabinet
Office explained that they were aiming to “measure how much red tape
costs businesses and voluntary organisations so we can cut it.” 27 As a result, as part of the cross-government initiative, the Charity Commission of
England and Wales had a target of a twenty-five percent reduction in administrative burdens placed on charities by 2010, with its main focus being
areas of accounting and reporting. 28
Third, governments discovered the call for red tape reduction to be politically advantageous. Few oppose the reduction of red tape, and it also
allowed these governments to reform their public service administration
with an eye on costs. Contracting the delivery of community services to
nonprofit organizations was rapidly increasing with government reports
identifying significant efficiencies being available through administrative
reforms. 29 Some state governments included nonprofit organizations in
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their red tape reduction programs. 30 For example, in 2005, the Department
for Victorian Communities commissioned an options paper on reforming
nonprofit regulation with an emphasis on compliance burdens.31 As a consequence, in the following year, the Victorian government included the
nonprofit sector in its target for reduction of regulatory burdens “by 15
percent [in] three years and [by] 25 percent over five years.” 32
The incoming Commonwealth government in 2007 (Australian Labor
Party) was elected on a platform of charity reform and charged the Productivity Commission with revisiting the reform of charity. 33 While that inquiry was being initiated, the Senate held an inquiry into the disclosure
regimes of charities 34 after an online consumer affairs magazine demonstrated lack of transparency and comparability of financial information of a
selection of household-name overseas aid charities. 35 The Senate inquiry
supported the CDI report in relation to a national regulator but looked further into the annual reporting of organizations. Its concession to increased
paperwork burden on organizations was to suggest that it should be proportionate, with three tiers of reporting based on revenue of the organizations. 36
The Productivity Commission inquiry was finally established several
months later in 2009 and reported in 2010 with a detailed reform blueprint
to establish an independent charity regulator, and to introduce a new statutory definition of charity. 37 Many submissions pointed to the benefits that
for-profit businesses had gained from reforms over recent years, where the
focus was on microeconomic reforms to corporate and tax regulation as
well as mutual recognition of business licensing between states and territories. 38 Using the phrase “one-stop shop,” the Commission recommended
that the multiple reporting requirements, few of which were proportionate
to the size of organizations or regulatory risk, be streamlined in a new regulatory framework with a central regulator. 39 The new regulatory body
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would replace “equivalent functions in existing regulators” and provide a
“single portal for the lodgement, maintenance and dissemination of corporate and financial information proportionate to size and risk.” 40 This portal
would also be the single source of truth for government transactions with
the sector such as licensing and contracting for community services, reducing duplication through “report once, use often.” 41
For the first time in any of the reports about the regulatory structure of
the Australian nonprofit sector, the Commission identified that the administration costs of government funding of the sector to perform its role of
community service provision were significant and considerable efficiencies
could be effected. 42 While it made a raft of suggestions for governments of
all jurisdictions to reduce these costs for themselves and their nonprofit
partners, it also proposed a central repository of corporate information
about organizations to eliminate duplication both in filing by the sector and
assessment by different government agencies.
The submissions largely reflected this view. The Catholic Church
Bishops’ Conference did not mention the issue of a specialist charity regulator but instead made a case for a tiered regulatory schema that would be
minimal for small parish organizations. 43 On the other hand, the Catholic
health and welfare organizations, not including Catholic hospitals, that
made submissions saw the benefit of streamlined regulation for themselves
and their clients.44 The trade body representing most of Australia’s professional charitable trustees wrote:
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The Australian Labor Party’s 2010 election campaign platform included a scoping study for a “one-stop shop” nonprofit regulator and
“greater harmonisation and simplification between the Commonwealth,”
and state and territory governments on nonprofit sector issues, including
regulation. 46 On its re-election, the Treasury was tasked with preparing a
scoping study in consultation with the sector. It set out the goals of the
regulation with a clear red tape reduction agenda to:
x place minimal costs on NFPs to allow better direction of NFP
resources to philanthropic objectives;
x remove current regulatory duplication;
x streamline requirements, including reporting, so as to provide
consistency and minimize compliance costs;
x provide a “one-stop shop” for NFP entities, to assist all NFP
entities to more easily access information that helps them understand and comply with their regulatory obligations;
x be simple, transparent and flexible;
x provide NFP entities with certainty as to their rights and responsibilities; and
x be proportional to the size and complexity of NFP entities,
and to the public monies and risks associated with NFP entities.47
The final report found agreement with these goals with only ten out of
161 submissions offering a different view, largely concerned with the impact of changes to regulation of certain types of entities, such as some religious organizations.48 The report warned that full implementation of a
national regulator was dependent on the cooperation of the states and territories. 49
The bill to establish a national regulator, the Australian Charities and
Not-for-Profits Commission Bill 2012 (“ACNC Bill”), was introduced after
lengthy public consultation on several draft bills. The government relented
to pressure from the sector to add a third object to the ACNC Bill, to promote the reduction of unnecessary regulatory obligations on the nonprofit
sector. 50 The government’s narrative surrounding the bill was liberally
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peppered with the desire to slash red tape. 51 Introducing the bill, the Assistant Treasurer stated that it was “promoting a reduction in unnecessary
regulatory obligations on the sector [which was] currently subject to overlapping, inconsistent and duplicative regulatory and reporting arrangements.” 52 The Minister went on to explain that “[t]his will be achieved in
part through initiatives such as the Charity Passport and the development of
a ‘report-once, use often’ reporting framework, and through the ACNC
Commissioner working and cooperating with other government agencies.” 53
The Opposition party spokesman on the issue, Kevin Andrews (Liberal Party), took a different view in his speech to the parliamentary debate.
Firstly, he presented an understanding of civil society where the state, the
government and its bureaucratic agencies should be facilitative—”lightly
touch” and regulate only to the extent necessary. 54 While acknowledging
that the reason given for the bill was “simplifying and easing the regulatory
burden,” he argued that it had gone too far without any meaningful agreements from state jurisdictions to be involved, 55 and concluded:
       Ǧǡ    
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         Ǧ
 Ǥ 56
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This line of argument followed an address by Andrews a couple of
months previously about “reversing the nanny state.” 57 He also indicated
that while respecting the role of the state governments, the new body
should seek to coordinate all levels of government to standardize financial
reporting. 58 In the same speech, commitments were given to cutting red
tape in relation to government funded community service provision, including streamlining contract administration with a single contract manager for
each charity, and to reduce financial, evaluation and client data reporting
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with longer-term funding contracts. 59 In fact, these appear to reflect what
the government at the time sought to achieve with the ACNC Bill, with the
unstated difference that it was not to be achieved through a central regulatory agency acting as a facilitator.
The ACNC Bill was subject to three separate parliamentary inquiries
during its passage, delaying implementation until December 31, 2012.60
These inquiries added little to the core contest of ideas outlined in the introduction of the bill into Parliament.
Ǥ 
What was the evidence behind the rhetoric to reduce red tape? The
Australian scholarship about the cost of government imposed paperwork is
dominated by the analysis of taxation paperwork burdens in a small business context.61 Paperwork studies (other than tax) have been regularly attempted by industry bodies to measure self-reported attitudes and
perceptions of businesses about government paperwork burdens.62 The
taxation compliance literature has concluded for some time that self-report
surveys overstate the compliance burdens for small businesses—asking
respondents to recall forms that they completed over a period prompts reporting based on the annoyance factor, such as that provoked by taxation
forms. Case studies and other benchmarking tools are preferred. 63 When
measuring tax compliance, Ian Wallschutzky and Brian Gibson noted that
“compared to other problems faced by small business, such as cash flows,
poor sales and high costs, compliance costs are not a first-order problem.” 64




06/09/2016 10:30:17

ͷͻǤ Id.
ͲǤ         Ǥ  Ǥǡ         
        Ǧ Ǧ       ʹͲͳʹͶʹȋʹͲͳʹȌǢ   
Ǥ  Ǥ Ƭ Ǥ Ǥǡ             Ǧ Ǧ 
     ʹͲͳʹǡ         Ǧ Ǧ  Ǥ ȋ  
  Ȍ   ʹͲͳʹǡ       ȋ      Ǧ Ǧ 
 Ȍ   ʹͲͳʹ Ͷʹ ȋʹͲͳʹȌǢ Tax Laws Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit
Concessions) Bill 2012ǡ  Ǥǡ
ǣȀȀǤǤǤȀ Ȁ ȀȀǤ͵Ǣα Ψ͵ΨʹʹΨ
ʹ Ψʹ ͶͺʹΨʹʹȋ Ǥͳ͵ǡʹͲͳȌǤ
 ͳǤ ǤǤǡ ǣ      ȋʹͲͲͳȌǢǤ
Ǥǡ   ȋͳͻͻȌǤ
 ʹǤ Ǧ   ǡ Ǥ      Ƭ Ǥ ȋͳͻͻǡ ͳͻͻͺǡ ʹͲͲͳǡ
ʹͲͲͶǡʹͲͲȌǢǤ    Ǥǡ     ǣ       ͳ
ȋʹͲͲͷȌǤ
 ͵Ǥ Ǥ Ǧǡ Tax Compliance Costs Methodology – A Research Agenda for the Futureǡ in
 ǣ      ǡsupraͳǡͷͳȂͺǤ
 ͶǤ Ǥ Ǥ   Ƭ Ǥ ǡ Small Business Cost of Tax Complianceǡ ͳͲ Ǥ  Ǥ
ͷͳͳǡͷͶͳȋͳͻͻ͵ȌǤ

38015-ckt_91-3 Sheet No. 103 Side A



38015-ckt_91-3 Sheet No. 103 Side B

Ͳ

ͳͲ͵ʹ

06/09/2016 10:30:17

 Ǧ ȋȌ

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

ͷȀ͵ͳȀʹͲͳͳǣʹ͵

ȏͻͳǣ͵




ͷǤ     Ƭ     ǡ Ǥ ǯ   Ǥǡ ȀǦ
  ǣ          Ƭ     
     ʹͺǡ͵͵ǡͷͲȋʹͲͲ͵ȌȋȌǤ

06/09/2016 10:30:17

 Ǥ Id.ͷͲȂͷͳǤ
 Ǥ     Ǥǡ supra  ͵ͳǢ ǯ Ǥ Ǥ  Ǥǡ      
ǣ                       
   ȋʹͲͲȌ ȋǤȌǢ     Ƭ Ǥǡ       
    ǣ                 ȋʹͲͲȌ
ȋǤȌǤ
 ͺǤ  ǦƬǤǡReducing the Compliance Burden of Nonprofit Organisations: Cutting Red TapeǡͺǤ ǤǤ ǤʹͳǡʹͷȋʹͲͲͻȌǤ
 ͻǤ IdǤʹͺǤ

38015-ckt_91-3 Sheet No. 103 Side B

In 2003, Margot Rawsthorne and Sheila Shaver conducted a selfadministered mail questionnaire of a sample of 1,800 Australian community service organizations (including nonprofits, for-profits and local government organizations) to measure hours spent per month completing
government forms. 65 They found that twenty-six percent of organizations
allocated more than eight days a month to client data reporting, with eighteen percent reporting more than eight days spent on financial reporting and
ten percent more than eight days on performance reporting. 66 Organizations
perceived an increase of paperwork over the previous five years, but the
study did not quantify the cost of such paperwork. The results indicated the
burden for nonprofits was located in applying for and acquitting government grants, not in reporting for taxation, corporate or fundraising regulation. The reporting burden related to government funding was confirmed by
several qualitative studies in 2006–07. 67
Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Christine Ryan spent a year collecting
compliance data by monthly logs from fourteen diverse nonprofit organizations on all paperwork required for local, state and federal governments in
2005. 68 This study quantified the time and cost of government-generated
paperwork (such as applying for grants or grant acquittals) for Queensland
nonprofit organizations. It found state government grant administration and
acquittal created the bulk of the compliance burden, not core entity accountabilities. Government grants paperwork made up eighty-five percent
of the time taken for compliance, amounting to 1.58 percent of an organization’s total revenue. By contrast, tax compliance associated with being a
nonprofit occupied 7.3 percent of compliance time and 0.07 percent of
revenue, as it was a periodic function built into an accounting regime. 69
Further, sixty percent of compliance forms were submitted to state government, compared with thirty-four percent to the Commonwealth. They
also took the opportunity to ask participants at the initial interview to recall
their last average submission and acquittal and estimate the time taken to
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complete them. The average recollected estimate was forty-six hours for
one grant submission and fourteen hours for a grant acquittal, whereas the
log forms actually recorded 15.17 and 6.04 hours respectively. 70 This confirms the observations of tax compliance scholarship that self-reported
surveys can significantly over-estimate compliance burdens.
Another source of regulatory burden is in the legal establishment of a
nonprofit enterprise and obtaining the licenses needed to carry on its business. While this is a one-off cost, it can operate as a significant barrier to
entry of new organizations. Using the World Bank’s barriers to entry of
business methodology, 71 McGregor-Lowndes measured start-up times in
2010 for nonprofit enterprises.72 Incorporation and fundraising licenses in
some jurisdictions could take up to seventy-seven business days. Moreover,
the Australian National Audit Office (“ANAO”) found the average time for
the ATO to process applications for deductible gift recipient (“DGR”) status was 36.7 days 73 (compared to the ATO’s service standard of twentyeight days). The ANAO’s audit noted that some applications requiring
assessment by other Commonwealth agencies could take up to two years.74
At the time, there were 206 applications (7.8%) which had taken over ninety days, and seven (0.3%) had taken more than two years. 75
As noted above, the political fanfare introducing the ACNC Bills
package emphasized slashing red tape. The formal Parliamentary documentation was far more conservative. The Regulatory Impact Statement
(“RIS”) for the ACNC Bill was unable to provide any definitive regulatory
costs, or even estimations. 76 It included statements such as:

The Explanatory Memorandum for the ACNC Bill clearly indicated:
   ǣ
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Given the evidence about the origin of administrative burdens and the
objective of the ACNC, what was actually achieved by the new regulator?
The following observations are surprising.
Ǥǯ  

  
          
      Ǥ   ǡ     
        Ǧ
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As the ACNC Act’s third object to reduce red tape was an amendment
to the bill, no budget appropriation had been made for its cost and the
ACNC had to reprioritize its existing budget. In its first year, the ACNC
reached out to the charity sector, Commonwealth and state agencies to
develop an agenda of red tape reduction. It was able to include some questions in an established annual sector survey to ask charities whether it
should focus on aligning obligations between jurisdictions or streamlining
Commonwealth obligations. Twice as many charities opted for alignment
between jurisdictions, rather than for streamlining Commonwealth obligations. 79
Under the auspices of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,
the ACNC established a forum that brought together all Commonwealth
agencies dealing with nonprofit organizations to map the existing regulatory requirements, agree to a demarcation of responsibilities and progress the
development of the charity passport. This was a concept to allow agencies
real-time digital access to ACNC registry information, eliminating the need
for charities to provide core corporate information to multiple agencies—an
example of “report once, use often.” It would be a single point of verification for the core information about a charity. An early win to entrench this
practice was the Commonwealth Grant Guidelines issued by the Department of Finance and Deregulation, which gave directions to all Commonwealth agencies that:
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The ACNC also planned to have over twenty-five working parties
with government agencies and the sector to discuss streamlining administrative requirements. It established a non-government schools group and a
social services group to identify and reduce areas of duplication. Nongovernment schools, pre-schools and universities already had significant
and detailed reporting requirements far beyond that required by the ACNC,
and it was keen not to increase the burden for this group, some of which
had already expressed displeasure in anticipation of the prospect.
During the first year of the ACNC’s operations, the sector experienced
a marked improvement in the time taken for charity tax concessions to be
granted. Under the new regime, the ACNC decided whether an organization was legally a charity and then forwarded the application for tax approval to the ATO. First, a combined application form was developed with
electronic filing. In early 2013, 98.6% of applications to the ACNC and
ninety-five percent of applications to the ATO were finalized within fourteen days of filing. 81 This is a significant achievement, given the introduction of a new process and involvement of two offices with different
computer systems. Further, it was a significant reduction on times found in
the ANAO’s review of the ATO’s administration of DGRs as outlined
above. 82 In its second year, ninety-one percent of applications were finalized within fifteen days, despite the unsettling effects of its threatened demise during this period. 83 In relation to annual statements, for the first
statement the ACNC received ninety-nine percent of those required to
submit, a remarkable result for a new regulator, working off an outdated
register. 84 It had to cull over 9,000 defunct charities from the ATO’s records. 85
The ACNC also streamlined reporting for charities registered with the
company regulators—by becoming registered charities, these corporations
no longer have corporate law obligations to file annual financial reports or
change of address and directors. South Australia and the Australian Capital
Territory (state level jurisdictions) have announced their intention to align
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their regulatory and reporting arrangements for charities with those of the
ACNC, and two other states are considering following suit. 86 As a transitional measure for the first two years, the ACNC agreed to accept the financial returns provided by charities to their own state government
regulators (e.g., for incorporation or fundraising regulators).
A year after its establishment, the ACNC commissioned an independent consulting firm to measure the Commonwealth compliance costs of
charities registered with it.87 Using a case study and survey methodology, it
was found that the average annual cost burden imposed by the ACNC was
$150 (equal to 0.1 percent of the total annual burden).88 This is remarkable
given it would have included start-up costs for the first annual return that
will reduce in future years. On average, the Commonwealth imposed between $27,000 and $38,000 worth of red tape annually on the case study
charities, with government funding agreements creating the largest burden. 89 State regulatory burden was not measured, but inconsistencies in key
regulatory frameworks across the states and territories were reported.90
Fundraising regulation and incorporated association reporting were the
major concerns.
On the change of government in 2013 the ACNC’s red tape program
was severely hampered by the government’s intentions to abolish the organization completely. The ACNC’s 2013–14 annual report noted:
ȏȐ       ǡ    Ǧ
Ǥ  
           
 Ǥ 91
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All working parties went into abeyance and discussions with the states
faltered. The ACNC managed to have consultations with representatives
such as the National Catholic Education Commission and the Independent
Schools Council of Australia, but only the Commonwealth AttorneyGeneral’s Department continued with the charity passport.92 The incoming
Finance Minister issued new grant guidelines that omitted the 2013 direc-
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tion to agencies specifically not to duplicate ACNC registry information,
and instead directed:
           Ǧ
  ǡ 
ǡ      ǡ     
Ǥ 93

Many took this as code to disregard the ACNC which was marked for
abolition. Key performance processing times also started to lengthen, as
ACNC staff facing retrenchment left for other employment and it became
difficult to recruit staff for a doomed agency. At this point, it is appropriate
to examine the disestablishment of the ACNC, under the new government’s
policy to reduce red tape.
Ǥ     
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A conservative coalition government came to power in September
2013. Its formal policies announced before the election did not specifically
include the abolition of the ACNC, although then shadow minister, Kevin
Andrews, made some speeches promising its abolition. 94 The ACNC’s
demise was not one of the “first 100-days action items” published by the
new government. The administrative arrangement continued, with the Assistant Treasurer as the Minister having portfolio responsibility for the
ACNC, but the Minister for Social Services, Kevin Andrews, was assigned
policy leadership of the nonprofit arena. 95 It was Andrews who drove the
disestablishment agenda over the next year until a cabinet re-shuffle removed him from his ministerial post.
The new government had a wide and ambitious red tape reduction policy with the objective of reducing the cost of red tape for businesses, community organizations and individuals by at least $1 billion per year. 96 The
planned implementation included the establishment of portfolio deregulation units and ministerial advisory councils, the conduct of regulatory audits across portfolios, and quantification of the regulatory burden. There
was also a planned biannual “bonfire of red tape,” with the first Repeal Day
in March 2014, removing 10,000 pieces of unnecessary or redundant statu-
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tory regulation, 97 although subsequent Repeal Bills have had a more difficult passage through parliament. 98
The Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (Repeal)
(No.1) Bill 2014 was introduced into Parliament by the Minister for Social
Services in March 2014. This appeared to be the first bill in a two-stage
repeal process, as it referred to an Australian Charities and Not-for-profits
Commission (Repeal) (No.2) Bill 2014 to be introduced at a later stage
(which has not yet happened). The first bill would repeal the ACNC legislation, but would not come into effect until the second bill commenced,
with the Minister appointing by regulation any “successor agency.” The
second bill would have to deal with amending thirty-seven separate pieces
of federal legislation which facilitated a uniform definition of charity for
Commonwealth agencies. The Queensland Law Society described the first
bill as “somewhat problematic, given the current government’s intention to
reduce obsolete legislation on the statute books by adopting a two-stage
legislative process.” 99 The rationale in the bill’s Explanatory Memorandum
was:
         
      Ǣ ǡ  
 ǦǤ
ȏȐ  
   ǡ     Ǧ   
ȏȐ      ǡ    Ǧ
ǦǦǤ 100

And,

These assertions were backed up with the claim that 6,000 incorporated associations that are charities are burdened with duplicative reporting
due to the ACNC. 102 The claim does not acknowledge that the ACNC
Commissioner agreed to accept financial reports filed with state and territo
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ry regulators while harmonization progressed, 103 and the ACNC’s transitional arrangements with other Commonwealth agencies already receiving
detailed annual returns from schools, universities and research bodies. Expecting a worthwhile evaluation of harmonization outcomes within fifteen
months of the ACNC commencing is arguably not reasonable, particularly
given the uncertainty that the change of government brought with it. Moreover, the ACNC legislation already mandated a review at five years.
As for the immediate red tape savings of the first bill, the Explanatory
Memorandum noted that:
         ǡ 
             
      Ǥ   ǡ      Ǧ
 Ǥ 104
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The new government did not have a majority in the Senate (upper
house) and relied upon either the opposition or minor parties and independents to pass legislation. The bill was referred to a Senate committee for
consideration. After written and oral submissions, the committee produced
a report divided along party lines with dissenting reports. 105 The key issue
in the majority report was red tape, with other issues being the excessive
powers granted to the ACNC and the suitability of returning responsibility
for defining charities to the ATO. The majority report pointed to duplicative reporting for universities, Catholic schools, medical research institutes
and trustee companies, all of which had significant reporting obligations
with other agencies. On harmonization with state and territory legislation,
the majority report stated that “[g]iven the Commonwealth’s limited legislative powers in this area, and the low probability of achieving nationally
consistent regulation, the Act should be repealed.” 106 But after noting the
progress that the ACNC had made in just fifteen months, it conceded that
the “ACNC has shown what can be done when there is a commitment to
achieving national harmonisation of charities regulation. Were the bill to
pass, another Commonwealth agency . . . could and should build on the
work of the ACNC in this area.” 107 And with ACNC transferring some
functions to the ATO, the majority commented that “the ATO could learn
much from the way the ACNC has interacted with the not-for-profit sec-
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tor.” 108 Both dissenting reports supported the retention of the ACNC, praising its impressive achievement in red tape reduction in its very short life
and its strong support for its work in the charitable sector. 109
Phil Saj subjected the majority report, written submissions and oral
testimonies to rigorous content analysis.110 He found that the majority report “ignored the overwhelming consensus view of the sector, its professional advisors, knowledgeable academics and others, in favour of partisan
and sectional interests.” 111 Only seven of the 154 written submissions supported the repeal bill and these seven submissions made up “61% of the
evidence cited by the majority Committee . . . .” 112 The seven submissions
consisted of three stakeholder groups: education, encompassing universities
and Catholic schools; health, encompassing Catholic hospitals and medical
research institutes; and professional charitable trustees. Education and
health charities were already required to provide comprehensive reporting
to Commonwealth departments. The ACNC had waived the need for duplicative reporting during the transition, and was working towards a long-term
sharing of filed data with other departments in line with its principle of
“file once, use often.”
As noted above, the professional charitable trustees with significant
management of philanthropic trusts had previously acknowledged the burden of overlapping regulation before the ACNC was established, 113 but
now joined another peak body advocating for the ACNC’s abolition. They
now claimed that the ACNC would result in an added reporting burden.
Some connected this change of attitude to the fact that the group had been
accused of “gouging fees” from testamentary charitable trusts, 114 and a
Commonwealth inquiry had recommended that the ACNC or some other
body initiate audits of their administration. 115
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In July 2014, the Department of Social Services, under the direction of
Minister Andrews, released a public consultation paper about replacement
arrangements following the planned abolition of the ACNC. 116 The paper
was placed in the context of the Government’s
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Having considered eighty-eight submissions and conducting face-toface consultations, the Department released its final report some six months
later. 118 It noted that “many stakeholders spoke of the benefits of having a
dedicated charities register” and “strong support for retaining the Charities
Register or a form of public register.” 119 The paper was entitled Options for
Replacement Arrangements but only one option was proposed. It consisted
of self-reporting arrangements, under which charities and other nonprofit
organizations that received government funds or tax concessions would be
required to maintain a publicly accessible website displaying the names of
their board members, financial reports and details of all funding from any
level of government. Organizations with regulators that already made information public, such as schools, universities and aged care institutions,
would be exempt. The paper added that “only cases of wilful noncompliance with reporting requirements will be investigated.” 120 It appeared to recognize in the responses to submissions that there was a loss of
efficiency and security that a one-stop shop ACNC register had brought
and difficulties in assuring the integrity and consistency of self-disclosed
financial information. Some submissions pointed to the cost of establishing
and maintaining a website for small organizations. 121 A suggestion was for
government departments to disclose grants on their websites to reduce the
costs for nonprofit organizations. 122
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The determination of charitable status function would be returned to
the ATO, but with some alterations. The ATO would centralize the function into a single administrative unit, which could address the problems
found by the Auditor-General, with decentralized offices making inconsistent decisions. 123 The paper offered two solutions to the suggestion that,
as a revenue office, the ATO had a conflict of interest potentially affecting
its judgement. One was to establish an independent panel that would be a
first point of appeal for disputed definitional issues and that would have the
power to make non-binding recommendations to the Tax Commissioner.
This would be in addition to the usual appeal processes. The other proposal
was for ATO administrative arrangements to include an internal appeal to
ATO staff who were not involved in the administrative areas where the
initial definitional decision was made. The responses noted by the Department indicated that both options would involve greater costs and delays for
all parties, possibly exacerbated further by adherence to the rules of natural
justice in the review process. 124
The consultation paper made the argument that Commonwealth agencies such as the ATO and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (“ASIC”) already had sufficient powers to provide a regulatory
compliance framework, as did state and territory regulators, and nothing
further was needed. In response, the sector made several points:
x the ACNC had developed a regulatory approach that was proportionate, risk-based and effective, and future nonprofit regulators should adopt its measures;
x state and territory laws were out of date and no longer fit for
purpose; and
x harmonization of laws across all jurisdictions was required to
reduce the administrative burden on charities.125
The transitional arrangements outlined in the paper were scant. Once
the bill abolishing the ACNC was passed and proclaimed, charities would
have until the new financial year to establish a website with the required
information. Information collected by the ACNC would be archived and
passed on to other regulators for their use. The ATO and ASIC would revert to their previous regulatory roles immediately upon the legislation’s
assent. The government has not publicly responded to a summary of the
submissions prepared by the Department.
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At about the same time, the Department of Social Services also commissioned an academic center to develop a model for a National Centre of
Excellence (“NCE”). 126 The Minister at the time, Kevin Andrews, had suggested when in opposition that what was needed was “a small body that
would act as an educative and training body to help lift standards without
the overbearing regulatory and enforcement powers.” 127 The report recommended that a joint venture of existing organizations be established to deliver sector capacity building, with a focus on how to provide evidencebased measures of social outcomes. It would be funded by a $100 million
endowment, funded by the community, possibly facilitated through a special purpose government bond issue. 128 The brief given to the consultants
expressly excluded canvassing the retention of the ACNC, but they found
that if it were a choice between an NCE and the ACNC, the sector would
choose the ACNC. Further, they remarked that “[T]here is a strong underlying tiredness and cynicism described by participants in this project. People are frustrated with what they perceive as constant change and what they
perceive as the lack of listening to the sector’s views about what is needed
and wanted.” 129 The government has never publicly responded to the commissioned report, but in June 2015 the Senate passed a motion calling on
the government to withdraw the ACNC repeal bill noting that:

Two months later industry press reported that once cabinet approval
has been gained, the bill will not be progressed. 131 In the meantime, there
has been another cabinet reshuffle with new ministers appointed to both
portfolios administering the ACNC.
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The rhetoric of reducing red tape has been employed by both sides of
politics in Australia to justify all types of reform, both for external parties
and internal administration. The charity sector and different political parties
used the red tape burden narrative in the debate about a national regulator
for charities, but the same argument led the protagonists to different conclusions. It was clear that establishing the ACNC would initially increase
compliance costs from a base-line at which the taxation authorities had
allowed self-assessment of concessional charity status and required no
annual information return, let alone financial statements. But the argument
for establishing a central regulator rested upon the ACNC being able to act
as a central repository of charity information that would be filed once and
used many times by the other agencies that did require compliance reporting, thus decreasing the overall burden. The other side argued that reduction of the compliance burden did not need a new central agency, which
would instead add to the paperwork; instead, the various Commonwealth
and state agencies generating the burden should put their houses into order.
Putting the political discourse to one side, the empirical evidence
strongly indicated that the compliance burdens of Australian charities derive from applying for and reporting on grants and contracts for services.
While this arises at both state and Commonwealth levels, it is predominantly generated at the state level. A secondary burden arises from overlapping
incorporation and fundraising regulation at the state level, for charities
operating across jurisdictions. The ACNC has played a key role within the
Commonwealth jurisdiction to streamline recording of core corporate and
financial information to a single point. It has also sought to act as a facilitator to gain cooperation of state and territory governments to improve and
streamline charity accountabilities and reduce the paperwork burden arising
from government grants and contracts. However, it can do little else to
relieve the regulatory burden on charities from state and territory governments.
The organization has clearly been under siege, with abolition hanging
over it for most of its short existence. Uncertainty has created serious challenges to its ability to retain and attract suitable staff; charities have been
unsure whether they still have to lodge annual filings and comply with its
laws, and government agencies have been reticent to progress reform with
an agency marked for abolition. In spite of these barriers, the ACNC has
achieved significant outcomes. Whether this period will be viewed by history as its prolonged death or a baptism of fire from which the ACNC
emerges toughened and resolved depends on factors which are largely be-
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yond its control at present. If its future is assured until the scheduled fiveyear review, there is every reason to believe that it will progress its objectives satisfactorily, including reducing red tape.ͳ͵ʹ
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132. After this paper was delivered and during editing, the Government announced on March 4,
2016 that having “consulted with, and listened to, all interested stakeholders. While there are a variety
of views, within the charitable sector there is sufficient support for the retention of the ACNC.” It
further claimed that “The Government will now work with the ACNC to remove duplication and increase accountability and transparency.” Media Release, the Hon. Kelly O’Dwyer MP, Minister for
Small Bus., Ass’t Treasurer, Retention of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://christianporter.dss.gov.au/media-releases/retention-of-the-australian-charitiesand-not-for-profits-commission.
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